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PROVING PATENT DAMAGES Is GETTING HARDER, BUT
ESTABLISHING PATENT INVALIDITY MAY BE GETTING EASIER-
How 141, L.P. V. MICROSOFT CORP. MAY CHANGE THE
LANDSCAPE OF PATENT LITIGATION
Audra Dial & Betsy Near*
Federal court dockets are flooded with cases of patent
infringement claims seeking substantial damages. Parties
defending against these claims often argue the patent being
asserted is invalid and should not have been issued The case of
i4i v. Microsoft is an excellent example of how evidentiary
principles for proving damages and patent validity can affect
outcomes, both at trial and on appeal. In this case, a substantial
damages verdict was upheld because of a party's failure to
properly preserve for appeal questions about the sufficiency of the
successful party's damages evidence. Given the substantial
amount of damages verdict upheld on appeal, this case had widely
been viewed to be another important decision about patent
damages. The Supreme Court is now poised to consider another
issue from the case: whether to lower the evidentiary burden,
which now requires proof through clear and convincing evidence,
for establishing patent invalidity. From a practical perspective, a
heightened standard unrealistically inflates the consideration that
each patent application receives and seems unnecessary, given
jurors' inherent tendency to defer to the expertise of the patent
examiner. Changing the standard, some argue, will weaken the
presumption that an issued patent is valid and discourage
innovation. Fortune 500 companies are lining up on both sides of
the battle, given their past patent litigation experience. Once the
Supreme Court weighs in, potential litigants may reconsider
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specializing in complex patent and trade secret litigation.
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whether to engage in a costly battle, particularly if the patent at
issue is of questionable validity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Patent infringement trials often involve the presentation of
complex evidence about infringement (how the accused device or
method infringes the patent), patent validity (whether the invention
described in the patent should have received patent protection), and
damages (how to adequately compensate the patent owner for the
alleged trespass on its rights). They often become extremely
expensive, particularly because parties typically hire multiple
experts to testify about these complex issues. With so much at
stake, parties must balance the costs to pursue patent litigation
against the possibility of a favorable verdict. As with any case,
assessing the possibility of a favorable verdict requires analysis of
the evidentiary issues affecting the claims and defenses likely to be
asserted in a patent infringement trial.
This article discusses how a case between i4i, L.P. and
Microsoft Corporation highlights the importance of evidentiary
principles relating to two of the three key aspects of patent
litigation-damages and patent validity. The article first explains
i4i's claims of infringement against Microsoft, the damages i4i
sought for the infringement, and Microsoft's challenge to the
validity of i4i's patent. Then, the surprising appellate decision
affirming both the jury's substantial damages award against
Microsoft and the finding that the i4i patent was valid is addressed.
The article proceeds with a discussion of what could have
happened if the appellate court had substantively reviewed i4i's
damages evidence. The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari,
focusing on whether patent invalidity must be shown through clear
and convincing evidence, is then described. A discussion of the
arguments on both sides of the debate about this evidentiary
standard follows. Finally, the article discusses how one's position
in that debate is impacted by a party's past patent litigation
experiences. It concludes with a discussion of which side is more
likely to prevail before the Supreme Court.
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II. THE TRIAL OF 141, L.P. V. MICROSOFT CORP.
A. The i4i Patent and Microsoft's Alleged Infringement
In early 2007, i4i Limited Partnership ("i4i")' sued Microsoft
Corporation ("Microsoft") for patent infringement in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.2 i4i owns
the "'449 Patent," which describes an improved method to edit
files containing eXtensible Markup Language ("XML").3 XML
helps a computer understand how information is related, such as
how a sentence should be displayed.' It does this by providing
embedded indicators (or tags) that explain the type of text being
displayed.! XML is widely used in documentation, databases, Web
sites, and the exchange of information across the Internet.' Here is
an example of documentation written in XML format:
<howto>
<title>How to Write a Mail Link</title>
<author>Jennifer Kyrnin, Web Design Guide</author>
<description>
<paragraph>
Use a HTML tag to allow your readers to send email directly from
your Web site.
</paragraph>
</description>
<directions>
<step>Write a link as usual <a href="">email me</a></step>
<step>Where you would normally put a URL, put the code
"mailto" <a href="mailto:">email me</a></step>
<step>Then put your email address after the colon <a
i4i is a Canadian company focused on "the design and development of
collaborative content solutions and technologies." 141, INC.,
http://www.i4i.com/overview.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
2 i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 839-40 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 839-41.
4 Id. at 839-40.
5 Id.
6 See Norman Walsh, A Technical Introduction to XML, XML.cOM: XML
FROM THE INSIDE OUT, (Oct. 3, 1998),
http://www.xml.com/pub/a/98/10/guideO.html?page=1.
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href="mailto:html.guide@about.com">email me</a></step>
</directions>
</howto>7
As is apparent in the example above, one can create and define
tags using custom XML.'
The lawsuit alleged that when certain file types (.xml, .docx, or
.docm) containing custom XML were opened in versions of
Microsoft Word ("Word") with an XML editing feature, i4i's
patented method was infringed.9  Microsoft denied these
allegations."o
B. i4i's Damages Evidence
During trial, i4i presented evidence about the amount of money
that would be appropriate to compensate it for Microsoft's
infringing activities." This evidence was primarily presented
through the expert testimony of Michael Wagner, i4i's damages
expert. He opined that a reasonable royalty would be the
appropriate way to compensate i4i for the sales it lost as a result of
Microsoft's use of i4i's patented method."
7 Jennifer Kyrnin, Who Uses XML?-XML Has Many Uses, ABOUT.COM,
http://webdesign.about.com/od/xml/a/aa06O4Ola.htm (last visited Jan. 25,
2011).
8 i4i, 598 F.3d at 839-41.
9 Id. at 848-53.
10 Id. at 839-41.
" Id. at 852.
12 Id. Michael Wagner is a certified public accountant with more than thirty
years of experience in the area of damages calculation in commercial litigation
and disputes, including serving as an expert witness on the subject. Transcript
of Testimony of Plaintiff's Expert Witness, Michael Joseph Wagner at 1-3, i4i
Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 670 F. Supp. 2d 568 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (No.
07CVOO 113), 2009 WL 7112103. Mr. Wagner also holds both an M.B.A. and a
J.D. Id.
13 i4i, 598 F.3d at 852-58. Damages for patent infringement can take the form
of either a reasonable royalty or lost profits from the sale of the infringing
product. JOHN M. SKENYON ET AL., PATENT DAMAGES LAW & PRACTICE § 1:3
(2010). Because i4i did not offer a competitive product, lost profits was not a
viable damages calculation. Id. § 1:7.
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To arrive at an overall royalty owed to i4i, Mr. Wagner used a
hypothetical negotiation model.14 This damages methodology was
articulated in the case of Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States
Plywood Corp.," and it seeks to determine upon which royalty the
parties would have agreed at the time the alleged infringement
began."6 The first step in this analysis, according to Mr. Wagner, is
to identify a "benchmark" product that contains the patented
technology and is comparable to the infringing product.17 Mr.
Wagner identified XMetaL, a competitive product, as the "least
expensive," standalone, comparable program whose functionality
primarily involved XML.'" Taking the price of the benchmark
product ($499) and multiplying it by Microsoft's profit margin
(76.6%), he arrived at a benchmark royalty of $96 for each Word
product containing the XML feature that Microsoft sold.'9
As a check on his analysis, he then applied the "25 percent
rule."20 This "rule" is a theory used by some damages experts to
evaluate the reasonableness of a proposed royalty rate because it
"assumes the inventor will keep 25% of the profits from any
infringing sales."2 1 Mr. Wagner then evaluated the Georgia-
Pacific factors 22 to determine the parties' respective bargaining
14 i4i, 598 F.3d at 852-54.
15 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
16 d. at 1119-20.
17 i4i, 598 F.3d at 852-53; see also SKENYON, supra note 13, § 3:38
(criticizing Mr. Wagner's analysis and expressing the view that the methodology
articulated by Georgia Pacific was actually misused, misconstrued, or not
applied in the damages analysis).
18 i4i, 598 F.3d at 853.
19 Id. at 852-53; see also SKENYON, supra note 13, § 3:13 (explaining
reasonable royalty generally).
20 In another Microsoft case decided after i4i, this theory was found to be "a
fundamentally flawed tool for determining a baseline royalty rate in a
hypothetical negotiation." Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1293,
1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
21 i4i, 598 F.3d at 853.
22 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1119 20
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). The factors are:
(1) The royalties received by the patent owner for the licensing of the
patent-in-suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty. (2)
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positions in the hypothetical negotiation.23  In that analysis, he
found that his baseline was too low and adjusted the royalty
The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable
to the patent-in-suit. (3) The nature and scope of the license, as
exclusive or nonexclusive, or as restricted or nonrestricted in terms of
territory or with respect to whom the manufactured product may be
sold. (4) The licensor's established policy and marketing program to
maintain its patent monopoly by not licensing others to use the
invention or by granting licenses under special conditions designed to
preserve that monopoly. (5) The commercial relationship between the
licensor and the licensee, such as whether they are competitors in the
same territory in the same line of business, or whether they are
inventor and promoter. (6) The effect of selling the patented specialty
in promoting sales of other products of the licensee; the existing value
of the invention to the licensor as a generator of sales of its
nonpatented items; and the extent of such derivative or convoyed sales.
(7) The duration of the patent and the term of the license. (8) The
established profitability of the product made under the patent; its
commercial success; and its current popularity. (9) The utility and
advantages of the patent property over the old modes or devices, if any,
that had been used for reaching similar results. (10) The nature of the
patented invention; the character of the commercial embodiment of it
as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those who
have used the invention. (11) The extent to which the infringer has
made use of the invention, and any evidence probative of the value of
that use. (12) The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may
be customary in the particular business or in comparable businesses to
allow for the use of the invention or analogous inventions. (13) The
portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention
as distinguished from nonpatented elements, the manufacturing
process, business risks, or significant features or improvements added
by the infringer. (14) The opinion testimony of qualified experts. (15)
The amount that a licensor (such as the patent owner) and a licensee
(such as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the
infringement began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying
to reach an agreement; that is, the amount that a prudent licensee-who
desired, as a business proposition, to obtain a license to manufacture
and sell a particular article embodying the patented invention would
have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a
reasonable profit, and which amount would have been acceptable by a
prudent patent owner who was willing to grant a license.
Id.
23 i4i, 598 F.3d at 853.
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upward by two dollars.24 To obtain a total amount of damages, he
multiplied his final per-unit rate ($98) by the number of infringing
Word products sold (2.1 million units).25 This resulted in a total
royalty of approximately $200 million.2 6
Microsoft argued that this damages figure vastly overstated the
value of the patented technology.2 7 Specifically, the XML feature
is a small part of Word's overall functionality.2 8 It is used only
when documents with custom XML are opened and saved.29
Because this aspect is one of hundreds of capabilities offered by
Word, and one that is seldom used by Word customers," Microsoft
24 Id; see also SKENYON, supra note 13, § 3:38 (criticizing i4i's expert's
process and expressing the view that the Georgia-Pacific factors were not
actually used at all or were misused).
25 i4i, 598 F.3d at 855-57. The number of infringing users was based on the
results of a survey conducted by i4i's survey expert. Id This survey was taken
by telephone, and although 900 companies were surveyed, only 46 responded.
Id. at 855. Of those 46, only 19 reported knowledge of employees who used
Word to open or save documents containing custom XML. Id. Based on these
19 responses, the survey expert concluded that 1.8 million Word users had used
it in an infringing manner. Id. Through assumptions based on this past use, he
concluded that there would have been 2.1 million infringing users up to the time
of trial. Id. at 855 n.4.
26 Id. at 852-53.
27 Id. at 853-55.
28 Id. at 854-56.
29 See id. at 848-57. Although Word documents generally contain markup
language tags that define how the text is displayed and some include XML tags,
only a fraction of these documents implicate the custom XML functionality of
Word. This is because only files with user-defined XML content that can be
accessed and manipulated apart from the data in the document must be opened
with custom XML. See Brian Jones, Integrating with business data: Store
custom XML in the Office XML formats, MSDN BLOCS (Nov. 4, 2005),
http://blogs.msdn.com/b/brianjones/archive/2005/11/04/integrating-with-
business-data-store-custom-xml-in-the-office-xml-formats.aspx (explaining
operation of custom XML in Word).
30 See Todd Bishop, How Microsoft will keep selling Word, working around
injunction, TECHFLASH-TODD BISHOP'S MICROSOFT BLOG (Dec. 23, 2009),
http://www.techflash.com/seattle/2009/12/how microsoft plans to keepsellin
g worddespite court ruling.html ("What are the implications [of Microsoft
removing the infringing technology from Word per the injunction]? For most
users of Microsoft Word, not a lot ... the custom XML feature in Microsoft
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argued that any damages resulting from the alleged infringement
would be de minimus.
C. Microsoft's Challenge to the Validity of i4i's Patent
The Patent Act outlines several requirements for patentability,
including that the invention described in the patent is novel (e.g., it
was not known or used by others or described in a printed
publication before the time that the patent application was
submitted) and is not obvious (e.g., it is not so similar to an
invention described in an existing patent that it would be obvious
to use the patented technology in that manner).32 Patents duly
issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO")
are "presumed valid" because the patent prosecution process
requires that patent examiners evaluate both novelty and
obviousness before issuing a patent.3 3
To establish invalidity, one must demonstrate that the patent
should never have been issued in the first instance. 34 This can be
proven by showing, for example, that the invention described in
the patent was not novel or was obvious.3 ' The Patent Act places
Word is actually not used very much."); Mike Masnick, Supreme Court Will
Review The Standard For Patent Infringement: Could Raise The Bar,
TECHDIRT (Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20101129/
17123112046/supreme-court-will-review-standard-patent-infringement-could-
raise-bar.shtml (describing the custom XML functionality of Word as a "rarely
used feature" and noting that "$98 [per unit] seem[s] pretty extreme for a minor
... feature"); Brian Osborne, Microsoft loses big in Word patent case,
GEEK.COM (Dec. 23, 2009), http://www.geek.com/articles/news/microsoft-loses-
big-in-word-patent-case-20091223 ("The case involves [Word's] little used
XML function."); see also i4i, 598 F.3d at 855 (discussing survey results).
31 i4i, 598 F.3d at 848-57.
32 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (2006).
33See 35 U.S.C. § 282 ("A patent shall be presumed valid."); 4 JOHN
GLADSTONE MILLS, III ET AL., PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 20:13 (2d ed.
2010).
See 4 MILLS, supra note 33, § 20:43 (explaining that defense of invalidity
may rest on "[n]oncompliance with any substantive condition of patentability
(i.e., want of statutory subject matter, lack of novelty, absence of utility, or
obviousness)").
35 See id.; 35 U.S.C. § 282.
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"the burden of invalidity" (e.g., rebutting the presumption of
validity) on the party challenging the patent.36 Although the Patent
Act does not articulate the evidentiary standard for satisfying this
burden, for more than twenty-five years the Federal Circuit has
required parties to present clear and convincing evidence of
invalidity. This standard applies regardless of whether the
invalidity defense relies on prior art38 considered during
prosecution or prior art that was never before the PTO.3 9
36 35 U.S.C. § 282.
37 See, e.g, Environ Prods., Inc. v. Furon Co., 215 F.3d 1261, 1265 (Fed. Cir.
2000); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1050 (Fed. Cir.
1988); Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359
(Fed. Cir. 1984).
3 Prior art refers to, "in general terms, . . . that fund of information ...
available or accessible to the public." 4 MILLS, supra note 33, § 10:2. Whether
an invention qualifies as "novel" or, alternatively, as "anticipated," depends on
the existing prior art. Id. Put another way, prior art includes all "knowledge that
is available, including what would be obvious from [that knowledge], at a given
time, to a person of ordinary skill in the art .... That an inventor was unaware
of . . . the prior art is immaterial." Id. In sum, it is the body of patents,
publications, and technology in existence at the time of the patent application.
Id. Prior art disclosed by the applicant or known to the examiner must be
reviewed by the patent examiner during prosecution, and if the prior art
demonstrates that the invention described in the patent application is not novel
or is obvious, then it is invalidating prior art. Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 102(a),
(b), (e) (defining types of prior art).
39 See Uniroyal, 837 F.2d at 1050. During trials involving claims of patent
invalidity, parties may present prior art that was reviewed and considered by the
examiner during prosecution or may present prior art that was not reviewed and
considered by the examiner during prosecution. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 10, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010), (No.
10-290), 2010 WL 3413088 ("the [] S4 system was never disclosed to the patent
office"); Al-Site Corp. v. Opti-Ray, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 1318, 1324 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (showing defense relied only on prior art previously considered by the
PTO). Obviously, given the fact that an experienced examiner considered prior
art during examination, such previously considered prior art is typically less
persuasive to a jury considering invalidity. Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate,
Inc., 755 F.2d 1549, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("[The] burden of proving invalidity
was made heavier" when "the PTO [had] . . . embraced and considered all of the
prior art" in a Reissue Proceeding); cf SSIH Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 375 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("the offering party is more likely
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At trial, Microsoft alleged that the invention disclosed in i4i's
'449 patent was embodied in i4i's S4 software product.40 It is
undisputed that i4i sold S4 in the United States more than one year
before it filed the application that led to the issuance of the '449
patent.4' In support of this argument, Microsoft relied on internal
i4i documents describing S4.42 Microsoft also relied on the S4 user
manual (rather than the S4 source code, which had been discarded
well before the litigation began).43 Microsoft alleged that this
public sale of the S4 software rendered the invention
unpatentable.4 4
i4i disputed that the S4 technology was the same as that
described in the '449 patent. Using the absence of the S4 source
code, i4i argued that Microsoft could not prove invalidity.4 5 In
other words, the S4 user manual alone did "not provide the level of
detail necessary to form a clear and convincing opinion about
what's actually being done by the ... [S4] system when its
software is executed." 4 6
D. The Jury Verdict and Judgment
After the completion of the evidence, Microsoft filed several
pre-verdict motions for judgment as a matter of law ("JMOL").4
These motions raised the following issues: infringement, validity,
to carry its burden of persuasion with [prior art not considered by the PTO
examiner]").
40 i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 846-48 (Fed. Cir. 2010);
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 39, at 3.
41 i4i, 598 F.3d at 846; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 39, at 6-7.
42 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 39, at 9.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 3. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) ("A person shall be entitled to a
patent unless-the invention was . . . described in a printed publication in this or
a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States."); 4 MILLS,
supra note 33, § 10:12 (detailing case law regarding application of "on sale" bar
in both patent prosecution and litigation).
45 See i4i, 598 F.3d at 847.
46 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 39, at 9 (emphasis added)
(quoting i4i expert testimony).
47 i4i, 598 F.3d at 840.
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and willfulness. Microsoft's motions did not challenge the
sufficiency of i4i's damages evidence. The court denied
Microsoft's motions, and the jury was then given the case to
decide.48
Before beginning its deliberations, the jury was instructed to
consider the amount of damages that would compensate i4i for
Microsoft's infringement, if it found that Microsoft infringed i4i's
patent. The jury was also instructed to consider whether
Microsoft's evidence questioning the validity of i4i's patent
satisfied the clear and convincing threshold.4 9  Specifically, the
jury instructions on invalidity stated:
Microsoft has the burden of proving invalidity by clear and
convincing evidence. Clear and convincing evidence means evidence
that produces in your mind a firm belief or conviction as to the matter
at issue . . . . Although proof to an absolute certainty is not required,
the clear and convincing evidence standard requires a greater degree of
persuasion than is necessary for the preponderance of the evidence
standard. If the proof establishes in your mind a firm belief or
conviction, then the standard has been met.
For a patent to be valid, the invention claimed in the patent must be
new, useful, and nonobvious. A patent cannot take away from people
their right to use what was known or what would have been obvious
when the invention was made. Microsoft has challenged the validity of
the '449 patent claims on a number of grounds. Microsoft must prove
that a patent claim is invalid by clear and convincing evidence. An
issued patent is accorded a presumption of validity based on the
presumption that the United States Patent and Trademark Office acted
50
correctly in issuing a patent.
The jury returned a verdict that Microsoft willfully infringed
i4i's patent rights and that i4i should be awarded damages in the
form of the $200 million royalty calculated by i4i's damages
expert.5 ' After the jury returned its verdict, Microsoft renewed its
48 Id.
49 Jury Instructions at 6, 15 20, 26 29, i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 670
F. Supp. 2d 568 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 6:07CVI 13).
50 Id. at 6, 15.
5i i4i, 598 F.3d at 840.
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52pre-verdict JMOL motions. Microsoft also separately moved for
a new trial on several new grounds, including the sufficiency of
i4i's damages evidence." The court denied these post-trial
motions and entered judgment against Microsoft in the amount of
$240 million, including $40 million in "enhanced damages" for
willfulness, as well as a permanent injunction.54
II. THE $240 MILLION JUDGMENT AGAINST MICROSOFT IS
AFFIRMED ON APPEAL
Microsoft appealed the verdict to the Court of Appeals of the
Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit"), challenging both the damages
evidence and the evidentiary standard required to prove
invalidity." The Federal Circuit affirmed the trial court's
judgment."
Regarding damages, Microsoft challenged the use of XMetaL
as the benchmark for establishing the royalty rate. XMetaL is a
sophisticated XML product" that offers many XML capabilities
beyond those available in Word's XML editing tool and thus was
argued to be an unfair comparison." Microsoft argued that the
more accurate benchmark was a version of Word containing XML
editing, which was $50 more than a version of Word that did not
offer this feature." Microsoft challenged the sufficiency of the
basis for i4i's damages testimony and sought a reversal of the
damages award, similar to what was done by the Federal Circuit in
Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc."o
52 Id.
53Id.
54 Id. at 840-41.
55Id.
56 Id. at 839.
Id.
58 Id. at 852-54. XMetaL also was never alleged to practice the '449
methods. Id.
59 Id.
60 580 F.3d 1301, 1311-16 (Fed. Cir. 2009). In Lucent, another patent
infringement case, Lucent alleged that Microsoft's use of a drop-down calendar
date selector feature in Outlook and other programs infringed its patent. Id. The
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Notably, the Federal Circuit could not answer the question of
"whether there was a sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury's
damages award" because of a critical procedural misstep.6
Microsoft did not properly preserve the issue for appeal.
Preserving this issue would have involved a three-part challenge to
i4i's damages evidence. In general, to challenge the sufficiency of
evidence presented at trial, a party must file a post-verdict JMOL
motion specifically raising that issue.6 2 To preserve all issues for
post-verdict JMOL motions, a party must also submit pre-verdict
JMOL motions (as Microsoft did).63 Those pre-verdict motions
must raise any objections about the sufficiency of trial evidence the
party may want to also raise in post-verdict JMOL motions
(Microsoft's did not).64 Doing this affords the appellate court de
jury found against Microsoft and awarded over $350 million in damages to
Lucent. Id. On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the "damages calculation
lack[ed] sufficient evidentiary support" and remanded the case for a new trial on
damages. Id. at 1308.
6i i4i, 598 F.3d at 857.
62 See Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 399
(2006) (holding that a party cannot challenge sufficiency of the evidence
supporting any part of jury's verdict on appeal unless that party had moved for
JMOL based on insufficient evidence of the specific issue before the case was
submitted to the jury and then had renewed that motion after the verdict);
Hyundai Motor Fin. Co. v. McKay Motors 1, LLC, 574 F. 3d 637, 641 (8th Cir.
2009) ("[I]f a party fails to seek judgment as a matter of law concerning the
amount of damages before the case is submitted to the jury, it may not raise the
issue for the first time in a post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law"
and may not challenge the sufficiency of evidence on the amount of damages on
appeal.).
63 If a pre-verdict JMOL motion does not include a particular issue, then any
post-verdict JMOL motions raising that previously omitted issue cannot revive
the issue for de novo review. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b) (establishing that post-
verdict motions for JMOL are "renewal[s]" of the party's pre-verdict JMOL
motions and thus they cannot raise issues not specifically raised in pre-verdict
JMOL motions).
64 See id.; Unitherm, 546 U.S. at 399; Hyundai, 574 F. 3d at 642 (affirming
denial of post-trial motion for judgment regarding amount of damages when pre-
verdict motion failed to specify challenge to evidence on amount of damages);
Chainey v. Street, 523 F. 3d 200 (3d Cir. 2008) (failing to raise an issue in a pre-
verdict motion for JMOL, with sufficient specificity to put the opposing party on
notice, waives the movant's right to raise the issue in its renewed motion for
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novo review of those specified issues." Otherwise, the appeals
court's review is confined to whether there is any evidence
supporting a particular issue, which is a much less comprehensive
review.6
A party is not required to do "the impossible and predict the
jury's alleged errors" dealing with the sufficiency of evidence,
including even the basis for a party's damages evidence.6
However, a pre-verdict motion for JMOL can allege that there is
no evidentiary basis supporting a calculation of damages greater
than a certain amount.6 1 Microsoft's failure to seek a pre-verdict
JMOL on the sufficiency of i4i's damages evidence meant that its
judgment as a matter of law after trial); Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Delta Cotton
Co-op., Inc., 457 F.3d 1269, 1274, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (post-
trial motion for judgment may not raise issues omitted from pre-verdict motion);
Junker v. Eddings, 396 F.3d 1359, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (failing to specify
facts on which motion is based at end of evidence will preclude post-trial motion
on additional grounds), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2937 (2005); Freeman v. Gerber
Prods. Co., 506 F. Supp. 2d 529 (D. Kan. 2007), appeal dismissed, 227 F. App'x
915 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
65 27A TRACY BATEMAN FARRELL ET AL., FEDERAL PROCEDURE LAWYERS
EDITION § 62:704 (2010) ("[A]n appellate court will conduct a de novo review
of the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for judgment as a matter of
law."); see also i4i, 598 F.3d at 857 (explaining that the court could not conduct
a de novo review of the sufficiency of i4i's damages evidence, which would
have been permitted under Rule 50(b), because of Microsoft's failure to meet
the procedural requirements of Rule 50).
66 See i4i, 598 F.3d at 857 ("[W]e are constrained to review the verdict under
the much narrower standard applied to denials of new trial motions . . . . We
must affirm unless the appellant clearly shows there was no evidence to support
the jury's verdict."); Sorrels v. Texas Bank & Trust Co., 597 F.2d 997, 999 (5th
Cir. 1979) ("Defendants' failure to comply with Rule 50 does not totally dispose
of this issue, however, because defendants moved in the alternative for a new
trial on the same ground. Therefore, we must inquire whether the trial judge
abused his discretion by [denying] the motion for a new trial [which generally
requires a finding that] there is a complete absence of evidence to support the
jury verdict . . .").
67 Douglas County Bank & Trust Co. v. United Fin. Inc., 207 F.3d 473, 478
(8th Cir. 2000); see also Hyundai, 574 F.3d at 642.
See Douglas County Bank, 207 F.3d at 478.
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post-verdict motion for JMOL on the issue was improper.6 9 Thus,
the Federal Circuit could not undertake a de novo review of the
sufficiency of i4i's damages evidence.70 Its review was instead
limited to whether there was any evidence to support the jury's
award." Given that there was some, albeit scant, evidence
supporting the verdict, the court had to uphold the award, primarily
because i4i's expert opinion satisfied Daubert's minimal
requirements.72
As for invalidity, the Federal Circuit again sided with i4i.
Pointing to i4i's use of the "discarded" source code to persuade the
jury that Microsoft could never have shown, to a clear and
convincing level, that S4 practiced the '449 patent, Microsoft
argued that the heightened evidentiary standard for invalidity was
outcome-determinative." Yet, even though such evidence was
nearly impossible for Microsoft to obtain, "the burden was still on
Microsoft to show by clear and convincing evidence that S4
embodied all [elements of the patent claims]."74
III. IF MICROSOFT HAD PRESERVED THE DAMAGES ISSUE FOR
APPEAL, WOULD THE JUDGMENT HAVE BEEN AFFIRMED?
69 i4i, 598 F.3d at 857; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 50; Unitherm, 546 U.S. at 399;
Hyundai, 574 F.3d at 642 (affirming denial of post-trial motion for judgment
regarding amount of damages when pre-verdict motion failed to specify
challenge to evidence on amount of damages); Douglas County Bank, 207 F.3d
at 478.
70 i4i, 598 F.3d at 857.
71 Id.
72 Id. The Federal Circuit noted that although the expert could have used
"better" facts or other "more accurate" data, the damages evidence was
nevertheless sufficient. Id.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 39, at 25 ("As the Federal Circuit
recognized, [b]ecause the S4 source code was destroyed . . ., the dispute turned
largely on the credibility of S4's creators . . ., who are also the named inventors
on the '449 patent," which i4i used, "repeatedly emphasiz[ing]" to the jury that
"Microsoft faced a steep hurdle in seeking to establish invalidity by clear and
convincing evidence in light of this disputed testimony.") (internal quotations
and citations removed).
74 i4i, 598 F.3d at 848.
12 N.C.J.L. & TiECH. ON. 119, 134
i4i, LP. v. Mrosoft
If the sufficiency of i4i's damages evidence had been
adequately preserved, it seems likely that the Federal Circuit's
decision would have been different. The court alluded to this
hypothetical outcome when it lamented that it could not review the
reasonableness of the damages award:
Had Microsoft filed a pre-verdict JMOL [on damages], it is true that the
outcome might have been different. Given the opportunity to review
the sufficiency of the evidence, we could have considered whether the
$200 million damages award was "grossly excessive or monstrous" in
light of Word's retail price and the licensing fees Microsoft paid for
other patents ... [W]e could have analyzed the evidentiary basis for the
Georgia-Pacific factors . . . [h]owever, we cannot.7 5
Even more tellingly, during oral argument, the panel hinted at
the direction its decision could have taken. Raising pointed
questions about the factual underpinnings of i4i's expert's
calculation, particularly the selection of an expensive "benchmark"
(XMetaL), the panel seemed skeptical about i4i's damages
evidence. 76 The panel also, not surprisingly, questioned the use of
the "25 percent rule," foreshadowing a recent Federal Circuit
decision squarely rejecting this "rule." The persistent questioning
even led i4i's counsel to concede that the limited scope of review
may have been the strongest basis for affirming the judgment: "I
hate to rely on the fact that this is a sufficiency of evidence
standard, but it is."78
The panel's questions about i4i's damages evidence were well-
founded. i4i's damages expert simply assumed "that just as many
people would buy the XML [editing] capability at $500 as used it
when it was a free 79 feature in [certain versions of] Word.""o Yet,
71 Id. at 857.
7 See Oral Argument at 25:30, i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d
831 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 1504-1), available at
http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/searchscript.asp (search for "i4i").
77 d.
781 d. at 51:30.
79 See generally id. (according to i4i, XML was essentially a free feature in
Word because of Microsoft's practice of including new features at no additional
charge as part of its business model of using new features to entice new
purchasers and to entice existing users to upgrade).
12 N.C.J.L. & TiECH. ON. 119, 135
i4i, LP. v. Microsoft
by adding an XML feature to Word, "Microsoft was ... addressing
a different segment of potential customers of XML: customers
who would not value XML enough to buy it as a separate product
and did not need enhanced features [like those available in
XMetaL]. These customers would be attracted to [Word's] XML
capability, but only at a low price."1 Given the significant price
difference and substantial difference in overall functionality
between XMetaL and Word,82 the assumption that Word customers
would pay substantially more to obtain XML editing capabilities is
suspect." Microsoft's prior license agreements with other parties
(none of which had royalties even close to 25 percent), the
"imbalance between infringing and non-infringing" features in
Word, and i4i's failure to account for the value of the additional
features available in XMetaL that were not available in Word raise
questions about the evidentiary support for i4i's damages
testimony.84
80 Alan Cox and Mario Lopez, 2 Economists' Take On i4i v. Microsoft, LAW
360 (Nov. 29, 2009), http://www.law360.com/articles/134462.
si Id. (emphasis supplied).
82 XMetaL is nearly $300 more than the most expensive Word versions that
contain XML editing capabilities and almost $450 more than the least expensive
versions of Word with XML editing capabilities. From a functionality
standpoint, the XML editor in Word was "fairly basic" as compared to the
"high-end" XML functionality available in XMetaL. Moreover, XMetaL did
not have word processing functionality comparable to the comprehensive word
processing capabilities of Word. See Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 32,
i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 2009-
1504), 2009 WL 3183218 (explaining differences between the products and
their scope); Oral Argument, supra note 76 (questioning regarding the panel's
concerns about the expert's reliance on XMetaL).
83 During oral argument, Judge Moore succinctly expressed this concern: "But
you think a $500 software package for XML, which is only a tiny portion of the
huge functionality offered by Microsoft Word, is a reasonable one-to-one
substitute? You think that every person that [for $200 or less] bought and used
Microsoft Word for an infringing use would have ... bought the $500 XML
XMetaL product as an alternative, if Word did not offer that functionality? I
mean, that's totally irrational." (emphasis added). Oral Argument, supra note
76.
84 See Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 82, at 33-35. The
amount of the awarded royalty, $200 million, compared to the $1 million to $5
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These concerns are consistent with the questions that led the
Federal Circuit to reverse a damages award in the case of Lucent
Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc." In that case, the Federal
Circuit criticized reliance on past license agreements that were
"radically different from the hypothetical agreement under
consideration," finding that the failure to rely on "sufficiently
comparable" licenses "weighs strongly against the jury's award." 6
Applying this logic in i4i would have likely led to a similar
outcome because XMetaL was not "sufficiently comparable" to
and was even "radically different from" Word."
Had a more searching standard of review been available, it is
likely the Federal Circuit would also have taken issue with i4i's
use of the "25 percent rule." In Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft
Corporation," the Federal Circuit expressly held that "evidence
relying on the 25 percent rule of thumb is ... inadmissible under
Daubert and the Federal Rules of Evidence, because it fails to tie a
reasonable royalty base to the facts of the case at issue."" This
reasoning echoed the court's holding in Lucent:
million lump sum license agreements Microsoft had entered for similar patents
under similar circumstances in the past, "leads to 'the unmistakable conclusion
that the jury's damages award ... is based mainly on speculation or guesswork."
Id. at 35 (quoting Lucent Tech., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1335
(Fed. Cir. 2009)). "As Lucent explained, where the accused functionality
represents 'but a tiny feature of one part of a much larger software program,' it
is 'inconceivable to conclude' that the infringer would pay more than 50% of its
anticipated revenues on thousands of non-infringing functionalities to the patent
holder."' Id. at 33-34. "Wagner[] refus[ed] to consider the impact of 'the
glaring imbalance between infringing and non-infringing' functionalities of
Word ... [which would be that] '[t]he only reasonable conclusion' . . . is that
'the portion of profit that can be credited to the infringing use ... is exceedingly
small."' Id. at 34-35 (quoting Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1332-33); see also In re Air
Crash Disaster at New Orleans, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234-35 (5th Cir. 1986)
(holding that an expert who "fail[s] to consider" relevant information or
"ignore[s] ... reality" should be excluded from offering an opinion").
8, 580 F.3d at 1325-32.
1 Id. at 1327, 1332 (emphasis added).
8 See supra note 82.
" Nos. 2010-1035, 2010-1055, 2011 WL 9738 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 4, 2011).
89 Id. at * 19 (emphasis added).
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[T]here must be a basis in fact to associate the royalty rates used in
prior licenses to the particular hypothetical negotiation at issue in the
case. The 25 percent rule of thumb as an abstract and largely
theoretical construct fails to satisfy this fundamental requirement. The
rule does not say anything about a particular hypothetical negotiation or
reasonable royalty involving any particular technology, industry, or
party.90
The "25 percent rule" was used by i4i's expert in much the
same way that Uniloc's expert did. For example, both experts
offered vague, unsupported explanations for applying the rule-
saying it is a "well-recognized" approach, 1 "it's widely used," 92
and "[i]t's generally accepted."93 Neither expert explained how the
facts of the case justified reliance on the "rule." Notably, i4i's
expert testified that neither i4i nor Microsoft ever began
negotiations with a 75/25 percent split, raising questions about how
the "rule" applied even as a check. 94 In addition, neither case had
testimony that the allegedly infringing component of the total
product justified such a split.95 i4i's expert conceded as much-
"[y]ou have an apportionment problem" with applying the "rule"
when the infringed patent is merely a small part of a larger
functionality or product.96 Finally, neither expert was able to show
that the 25 percent baseline was consistent with "other licenses
involving the patent at issue or comparable licenses."97 Thus, in
the words of Uniloc, "it is clear that [i4i's expert] testimony was
based on the use of the 25% rule of thumb as an arbitrary, general
rule, unrelated to the facts of th[e] case."9 8 The danger of the "25
90 Id. at *21 (emphasis added).
91 Transcript of Wagner Testimony, supra note 12, at 54.
92 Id.
93 Uniloc, 2011 WL 9738, at *22.
94 Transcript of Wagner Testimony, supra note 12, at 119.
9 Uniloc, 2011 WL 9738, at *22.
96 Transcript of Wagner Testimony, supra note 12, at 120.
9 See Uniloc, 2011 WL 9738, at *22; Transcript of Wagner Testimony, supra
note 12, at 115 20.
98 Uniloc, 2011 WL 9738, at *22 (emphasis added).
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percent rule" is particularly apparent here because the "starting
point" became the "reasonable" royalty.99
IV. THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
After the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment, Microsoft
sought certiorari from the United States Supreme Court.'00
Microsoft's appeal focuses solely on the standard of proof for
proving invalidity, challenging long-standing precedent
articulating this standard.' In late 2010, Microsoft's petition was
granted.'02
Given the substantial damages verdict upheld on appeal, this
case had widely been viewed to be another important decision
about patent damages. However, the ramifications of this case
now may be even more far-reaching in light of the issue before the
Supreme Court-whether the Federal Circuit "erred in holding that
Microsoft's invalidity defense must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence."' Specifically at issue is whether, when an
invalidity defense relies on prior art not considered by the PTO
during prosecution, the standard for proving invalidity should be
preponderance of the evidence.104 Thus, the Supreme Court is
faced with the possibility of reversing a decades-old standard,
which could significantly impact patent litigation.
A. Microsoft's Challenge to the Clear and Convincing Standard
Microsoft's challenge to this longstanding, well-settled Federal
Circuit precedent has significant support. The Federal Trade
99 See SKENYON, supra note 13, § 3:35 (explaining dangers of 25 percent rule
becoming the royalty rate).
00 Although the merits phase of the Supreme Court's briefing schedule for the
case had not yet begun as of the writing of the article, the parties' and amici's
arguments are well articulated in their briefs on certiorari.
101 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 39, at i, 2.
102 i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert.
granted, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010) (No. 10-290).
103 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 39, at i.
104 Id at 2-3, 12.
12 N.C.J.L. & TiECH. ON. 119, 139
i4i, LP. v. Mrosoft
Commission,"o well-known legal scholars,'06 and businesses of a
variety of sizes and types107 have voiced their support for reducing
105 U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, 28 (2003)
[hereinafter FTC REPORT] (noting that "there is no persuasive reason why the
level of th[e] burden should be clear and convincing evidence"), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
106 See, e.g., Stuart M. Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA?
What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269,
319 (2007) (arguing that the heightened clear and convincing evidentiary
standard is unwarranted because, "[u]nder boiler-plate administrative law, a
court cannot defer to agency factfinding if the agency has not even passed on the
factual question-the agency has not considered the factual question, so there is
nothing for the court to defer to"); B.D. Daniel, Heightened Standards of Proof
in Patent Infringement Litigation: A Critique, 36 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 412 (2008)
("The proper standard of proof for resolving all questions of invalidity ...
should be preponderance of the evidence."); Alan Devlin, Revisiting the
Presumption of Patent Validity, 37 Sw. U. L. REV. 323, 338 (2008) ("Either the
Federal Circuit or Supreme Court should hold that one seeking to invalidate a
patent face no more than a burden of proof on the balance of probabilities.");
Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of
Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 61 (2007); Matthew Sag & Kurt Rohde, Patent
Reform and Differential Impact, 8 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 1 (2007).
107 Eleven amicus briefs-filed by leading companies including Apple, Cisco,
Google, Wal-Mart, and Yahoo!; industry and interest groups, including the
financial services industry, wireless technology industry, and the open-source
community; a group of law professors; and generic pharmaceutical companies-
supported Microsoft's Petition for Certiorari, echoing many of Microsoft's
statutory and legal arguments and adding additional arguments against the clear
and convincing evidence standard. See Brief for Acushnet Co. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Microsoft Corp. v. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship,
131 S. Ct. 647 (2010), No. 10-290; Brief for Apple Inc., as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Microsoft Corp. v. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship,
131 S. Ct. 647 (2010), No. 10-290; Brief for CTIA-the Wireless Assoc.; Elec.
Frontier Found., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Microsoft
Corp. v. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010) (No. 10-290);
Brief for Facebook, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Microsoft Corp. v. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010) (No.
10-290); Brief for Google, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Microsoft Corp. v. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010) (No.
10-290); Brief for Intel Corp. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Microsoft Corp. v. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010) (No.
10-290); Brief for Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkt. Ass'n, et al. (SIFMA) as Amici
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the evidentiary standard required to rebut the presumption of
validity. This argument has even been presented to Congress,"
although it was never incorporated in various patent reform
proposals.o9
Microsoft's position, that an invalidity defense relying on prior
art not considered during prosecution should require only a
preponderance of the evidence, relies on dicta from KSR
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc."o In KSR, the Court "'th[ought]
it appropriate to note that the rationale underlying the
presumption-that the PTO, in its expertise, believes the claim is
patentable-seems much diminished' where an invalidity defense
rests on evidence that the PTO never had an opportunity to
consider."." Despite this dicta, the Federal Circuit has continued
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Microsoft Corp. v. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd.
P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010) (No. 10-290); Brief for Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., et
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Microsoft Corp. v. Microsoft
Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010) (No. 10-290); Brief for 36 Law,
Business, and Economics Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Microsoft Corp. v. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010) (No.
10-290); Brief for Yahoo!, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010) (No. 10-290). All of
these briefs are available at http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/microsoft-v-i4i-limited-partnership.
1os E.g., American Innovation at Risk: The Case for Patent Reform: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Daniel B. Ravicher,
Executive Director, Public Patent Foundation); Perspectives on Patents:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Joel Poppen, Deputy General
Counsel, Micron Technologies, Inc.).
109 See Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009) (as reported by
Mr. Leahy, with amendments, Apr. 2, 2009).
10 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
.n Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 39, at 2 (quoting KSR, 550 U.S.
at 427) (emphasis added). With respect to the Supreme Court's dicta in KSR, it
should be noted that, because the Patent Act expressly requires the presumption
of validity (35 U.S.C. § 282), it is not the "rationale underlying the presumption
[of validity]" that is the issue. Rather, it is the "rationale underlying" the
requirement that rebutting this presumption requires clear and convincing
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to apply a clear and convincing standard for all claims of
invalidity, asserting that the "KSR case did not change the burden
of proving invalidity by clear and convincing evidence."" 2 The
logic inherent in the Court's dicta in KSR does serve as an ideal
springboard for several practical and policy arguments to change
the standard.113
1. The Amount of Time Each Patent Application Receives During
Prosecution
From a practical perspective, the clear and convincing standard
seems to unrealistically inflate the time and consideration that each
patent application receives at the PTO. The sheer number of patent
applications has increased exponentially in the past twenty years,
while the number of examiners has not kept pace, leading to
overworked examiners."14 In a 2003 review of the patent system by
the Federal Trade Commission, it was revealed that "examiners
have from 8 to 25 hours to read and understand each application,
search for prior art, evaluate patentability, communicate with the
applicant, work out necessary revisions, and reach and write up
evidence of invalidity that "seems much diminished" when the evidence of
invalidity is prior art never before seen by the PTO.
12 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 39, at 11 (quoting Zenith Elecs.
Corp. v. PDI Commc'n Sys., Inc., 522 F.3d 1348, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 2008));
see also Lucent Tech., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1311-16 (Fed. Cir.
2009); Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1327 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
113 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 39, at 2 23; Brief of Google,
supra note 107, at 8 20; Brief for Yahoo!, supra note 107, at 16 22; Brief of
SIFMA, supra note 107, at 8-16; Brief for Intel, supra note 107, at 7-14; Brief
of CTIA, supra note 107, at 21 22; Brief of Apple, supra note 107, at 6-12;
Brief of Thirty-Six Professors, supra note 107, at 2-8.
114 See FTC REPORT, supra note 105, at 10 (exec. summary); Mark A.
Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Qffice, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495, 1500
(2001). Moreover, as noted in both the Petition and the Google Amicus Brief,
the number of patent applications has increased 37% since the FTC review in
2003, further stretching the examiners' time and ability to thoroughly review
each patent application. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 39, at 19;
Brief of Google, supra note 107, at 13 (citing PTO, PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT Tables 1-3 (2009), http://www.uspto.gov/about/
stratplan/ar/2009/2009annualreport.pdf).
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conclusions.""' This amounts to less than one week, or even as
little as one day, of time spent evaluating each application before a
patent is issued or denied.
The rules governing the examination process also seem to tilt
in favor of issuance: The examiner "bears the initial burden, on
review of the prior art . . . , of presenting a prima facie case of
unpatentability.""1 6 Evaluating whether the application discloses
an idea that is not novel or is obvious (and therefore
unpatentable)117 relies on either the applicant disclosing relevant
prior art for consideration or the examiner's personal knowledge of
it."' These requirements suggest that an applicant's judgment that
its idea is novel and worthy of protection should be given
deference, even though the applicant is hardly an unbiased
participant.
Thus, the lack of time examiners have to review each
application coupled with the burdens imposed on them can result
in the issuance of patents of questionable validity." 9 Microsoft and
the amici argue that requiring a heightened evidentiary standard,
particularly when the PTO did not (for whatever reason) see
certain prior art, "distorts" the system-perpetuating issuance of
patents that should not be issued without an effective judicial
115 FTC REPORT, supra note 105, at 10 (exec. summary).
116 In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also Brief for
Google, supra note 107, at 10 (quoting same); Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 39, at 19 21 (emphasis added).
117 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), (b) (2006).
" Brief for Yahoo!, supra note 107, at 16-17 (citing PTO, MPEP
§ 706.02(c) (8th ed., Rev. 7 (July 2010))).
119 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 39, at 20-21 (citing Sara
Schaefer Munoz, Patent No. 6,004,596: Peanut Butter and Jelly Sandwich,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2005, at BI; also citing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218,
3259 (2010) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting "the granting of
patents that 'ranged from the somewhat ridiculous to the truly absurd"')
(quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Mayer, J.,
dissenting))); Brief of Google, supra note 107, at 14 (citing Lichtman &
Lemley, supra note 106, at 47 (2007); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Bilcare, KSR,
Presumptions of Validity, Preliminary Relief and Obviousness in Patent Law,
25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 995, 1050-52 (2008)).
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check,'20 stifling competition and innovation, and shifting the risk
of PTO error to parties not involved in the examination process1 2 1
and likely not in control of the most relevant information regarding
validity.
2. The Increasing Number ofPatent Infringement Lawsuits
Another practical impact of the clear and convincing standard
has been its effect on the number of patent infringement lawsuits
filed. In its amicus brief, the CTIA-The Wireless Association
("CTIA") cites empirical studies comparing several indicators
before and after the heightened standard was imposed (e.g., the
numbers of infringement suits, patents found to be invalid, cases
tried to juries, and damages awarded).122  CTIA argues that,
because "the heightened evidentiary standard affects parties'
estimates of [the] risks [of litigation,] . . . patent holders . .. [can]
extract more settlement value from those they accuse of
infringement."l23
It is a daunting task at trial to prove invalidity given the jury
instructions on the statutory presumption of validity, the
heightened proof required for clear and convincing evidence, and
jurors' inherent tendency to defer to the expertise of the PTO.124 In
120 See Brief for Acushnet, supra note 107, at 17; Brief for Google, supra note
107, at 15 ("[P]atent applicants receive the benefit of favorable procedures and a
resource-constrained review by the PTO and then assert presumptively valid
patents that, according to the Federal Circuit, can be defeated only by clear and
convincing evidence. That serves only to insulate patents of dubious quality
from adequate scrutiny at any stage.").
121 See Brief for Acushnet, supra note 107, at 17.
122 Brief for CTIA, supra note 107, at 4, 12-17.
123 Brief for CTIA, supra note 107, at 4.
124 See Brief for Apple, supra note 107, at 12-15. "Some jurors refuse to
believe that they have the power to invalidate a patent, despite repeated
instructions to the contrary, because they view the patents as akin to federal
laws." Id. at 14 (citing Julie Blackman et al., East Texas Jurors and Patent
Litigation, 22 JURY EXPERT 5, 11 (2010)); see also Brief for CTIA, supra note
107, at 16-18 (quoting FTC/DOJ Hearings at 382 (Feb. 27, 2002) (testimony of
James Pooley) ("[The clear and convincing evidence standard] reinforces the
notion [for jurors] that the patent with the gold seal and the ribbon on it is
something that [they] as lay persons are not really qualified to look behind and
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light of these challenges with raising a key defense in a patent
infringement case, it is arguable that this heightened standard has
increased the number of patent infringement claims filed,
particularly by non-practicing entities ("NPEs"), whose business
model is primarily the licensing of patent portfolios, often through
litigation or the threat of it. 125 This is because defendants will be
faced with the possibility of difficult, expensive litigation and
therefore may settle the case, regardless of the strength of the
plaintiff's position.
3. Congress' Silence on the Evidentiary Standard for Invalidity
On the merits, principles of statutory construction, including
general tenets of civil litigation, may be the strongest arguments in
favor of reducing the evidentiary standard.126 It is well-
established'27 that the burden of persuasion in a civil claim is the
preponderance of the evidence, unless Congress expressly requires
a heightened evidentiary standard or "particularly important
question because someone with training has already checked this out at the
Patent Office.").
25 See Brief of CTIA, supra note 107, at 18-19 (explaining that this has been
beneficial to NPEs) (citing John R. Allison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on
Top? The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 1,
32 (2009) (finding that actions brought by NPEs "represent over 80% of the
suits filed involving the most-litigated patents")).
126 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 39, at 14; Brief of Google,
supra note 107, at 4 9; Brief of Yahoo!, supra note 107, at 5-15; Brief of
Acushnet, supra note 107, at 3-13; Brief of Elec. Frontier Found., supra note
107, at 17 20; Brief of SIFMA, supra note 107, at 19 21; see also Reply Brief
for Petitioner at 5-6, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010)
(No. 10-290), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/microsoft-v-i4i-limited-partnership (dismissing i4i's
counterargument).
127 The Supreme Court has held that generally applicable legal standards apply
in patent suits. See Brief of Google, supra note 107, at 4-5 (citing Medlmmune,
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007) (declaratory judgment standard);
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (permanent injunction
standard); Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 165 (1999) (standard of review of
agency action)).
12 N.C.J.L. & TiEC H. ON. 119, 145
i4i, LP. v. Mrosoft
individual interests or rights are at stake."l2 8 Importantly, the
Patent Act is silent as to the applicable evidentiary standard for
invalidity, stating only that "[a] patent shall be presumed valid....
The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim
thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity." 2 9 Thus,
the Act simply requires the party challenging validity to bear the
burden of proof, which is a basic evidentiary principle.'
The existence of a statutory presumption does not require a
particular evidentiary standard.131 A presumption simply dictates
that once a party establishes certain basic facts (e.g., an issued
patent), existence of a separate fact is then to be presumed (e.g.,
the patent is valid).13 2 The party challenging the presumption must
then present evidence (that is, he bears the burden of proof) to
rebut the presumed fact.'33 A separate concept is the burden of
128 See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991). "Because the
preponderance of the evidence standard results in a roughly equal allocation of
the risk of error between litigants, we presume that this standard is applicable in
civil actions between private litigants unless 'particularly important individual
interests or rights are at stake.' . . . [To the Court, statutory] silence is
inconsistent with the view that Congress intended to require a special,
heightened standard of proof." Id. (quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,
459 U.S. 375, 389-90 (1983)). Microsoft asserted this point in its Petition, but
did so more explicitly in its Reply Brief after several amicus briefs addressed it
at length. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 39, at 14; Brief of
Acushnet, supra note 107, at 3-13; Brief of Elec. Frontier Found., supra note
107, at 17 20; Brief of Google, supra note 107, at 4-9; Brief of SIFMA, supra
note 107, at 19 21; Brief for Yahoo!, supra note 107, at 5-15; Reply Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 126, at 5-6.
29 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
130 Id.
"' 1 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 301:1 (6th
ed. 2010) ("[U]nless specified to the contrary by an Act of Congress, a
presumption has no effect on the burden of persuasion [the degree of proof
required]. Only the burden of producing evidence is affected by a
presumption."); see also supra notes 126, 127, 128 and accompanying text.
132 See sources and text at supra note 131; see also infra note 133.
133 See I GRAHAM, supra note 131, § 301:1. In its amicus brief supporting
certiorari, Yahoo! offers the following attempt to clarify: "The 'presumption' of
validity in the first sentence means that the person challenging validity has the
burden of going forward with evidence on invalidity issues, as without such
12 N.C.J.L. & TiEC H. ON. 119, 146
i4i, LP. v. Mrosoft
persuasion (that is, the degree of evidence required for proving
one's position), which is always preponderance of the evidence in
civil cases unless otherwise specified "by an Act of Congress."l3 4
Congress' silence on the burden for proving invalidity is
noteworthy because the Patent Act expressly specifies that
defending against claims for infringement of business method
patents must be proven through clear and convincing evidence.13 1
The fact that Congress chose to articulate the clear and convincing
evidence standard in the Patent Act but did not do so for invalidity
supports the argument that Congress did not intend a heightened
standard to apply. 13 6
B. i4i's Defense of the Clear and Convincing Standard
Modifying this evidentiary standard is not uniformly supported,
however. Many Fortune 500 companies, interest groups, and legal
commentators oppose this change and are supportive of i4i's
position.m
evidence, the 'presumption' requires that any alleged invalidity defenses will
fail. Once evidence is presented, the second part of Section 282 places the
burden of persuasion on the party challenging validity." Brief of Yahoo!, supra
note 107, at n.3.
134 GRAHAM, supra note 131, § 301:1; see also supra notes 126-8 and
accompanying text.
135 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(4) (2006) ("A person asserting the defense under this
section shall have the burden of establishing the defense by clear and convincing
evidence."); see Brief of Acushnet, supra note 107, at 5; Brief of Google, supra
note 107, at 6.
See Brief of Google, supra note 107, at 6 (citing Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal
Co., 534 U.S. 438, 452 (2002)).
See, e.g., Letter from 171 Bus., Research Insts., & Orgs. to Eric H. Holder,
U.S. Att'y Gen., & Neal K. Katyal, Acting U.S. Solicitor Gen. (Dec. 22, 2010)
[hereinafter Holder Letter], available at http://www.bio.org/ip/letters/
20101222.pdf (regarding concerns with lowering the evidentiary standard and
requesting consideration when developing Government's position on Microsoft
v. i4i with the Supreme Court); Etan S. Chatlynne, Note, The Burden of
Establishing Patent Invalidity: Maintaining a Heightened Evidentiary Standard
Despite Increasing "Verbal Variances," 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 297, 316-18,
320-321 (2009) (expressing similar reasons for opposition to reducing the
evidentiary standard as those expressed in the Holder Letter and citing several of
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i4i's primary argument is that the clear and convincing
standard is based, not only on deference to the PTO, but on
Supreme Court precedent as well."' This argument relies on a
1984 Federal Circuit case, which cited a 1934 Supreme Court
decision, Radio Corp. v. Radio Laboratories,13 9 for the proposition
that "the standard of proof [does not] change; it must be by clear
and convincing evidence or its equivalent, by whatever form of
words it may be expressed," regardless of whether the invalidity
defense relies on art previously seen by the PTO.140 Because this
Supreme Court precedent existed at the time Congress codified the
presumption of validity, "Congress is assumed to have been aware
of this settled line of authority, . . . intend[ing its statute] to be
construed consistent with that authority-including the heightened
burden of proof."1 4 1
the sources included here); Mark D. Janis, Reforming Patent Validity Litigation:
The "Dubious Preponderance," 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 923, 938 (2004)
("Policymakers should not assume that a change to the presumption of validity
will only affect validity and will generate no compensating reaction elsewhere in
the patent system."); Scott McBride & Guy Barcelona Jr., The Two Sides of
'Efficient Patent Infringement': The Technique Involves a Calculation to Weigh
the Benefits of Infringing Against the Risks and Costs of a Liability Finding, 33
NAT'L L. J. 14 (2010) (hypothesizing that reducing the evidentiary standard may
lead to more infringing activities where the infringer has determined that the
likelihood of liability for infringement is outweighed by the benefits of
infringing, although acknowledging the limitations of this theory, including
deterrence by the potential for a finding of willful infringement).
138 Brief in Opposition of Certiorari at 7-12, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd.
P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010) (No. 10-290) (citing Radio Corp. v. Radio Labs.,
293 U.S. 1, 2 (1934) ("there is a presumption of validity, a presumption not to
be overthrown except by clear and cogent evidence"); Coffin v. Ogden, 85 U.S.
120, 124 (1874); Cantrell v. Wallick, 117 U.S. 689, 695-696 (1886); Adamson
v. Gilliland, 242 U.S. 350, 353 (1917); Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ont.
Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 60 (1923); Mumm v. Jacob E. Decker & Sons, 301 U.S.
168, 171 (1937); and Smith v. Hall, 301 U.S. 216 (1937)).
139 Radio Corp., 293 U.S. 1 (1934).
140 Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
141 Brief in Opposition of Certiorari, supra note 138, at 10-11 (citing N. Star
Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 34 (1995)). Yet, several cases cited in
support of Microsoft's petition directly contradict the idea of a "settled line of
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In a letter to both the Attorney General and Solicitor General of
the United States, written after certiorari had been granted, a
sizable contingent of Fortune 500 companies, associations, and
organizations voiced opposition to changing the standard.142 These
arguments claimed that reducing the evidentiary standard to a mere
preponderance of the evidence "weaken[s] the presumption of
validity ... thereby undermining longstanding investment-backed
reliance interests that are critical for domestic job creation and
economic growth, and for U.S. technological leadership
authority." See Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 107, at 5-6 (e.g., The
Barbed Wire Patent, 143 U.S. 275, 284 (1892) ("In view of the unsatisfactory
character of [oral] testimony," courts "have required that the proof shall be clear,
satisfactory and beyond a reasonable doubt."). Even the Federal Circuit
observed that, at the time Congress enacted the statutory presumption, case law
regarding patent validity and an attached presumption and burden of proof "was
far from consistent-even contradictory . . . ." Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 725
F.2d at 1359. In the years prior to the enactment of section 282, many courts
afforded no validity presumption to patents and required patentees to carry the
burden of proof, proving their patents valid by a preponderance of the evidence.
See H.F. Hamann, Editorial Note, The New Patent Act and the Presumption of
Validity, 21 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 575, 578-80 (1953) (noting that, before the
validity presumption was codified, "some courts [had] require[d] the patentee to
prove the validity of his patent by a preponderance of the evidence" and that
"[t]he The Supreme Court majority opinions since 1937 ... have not
affirmatively attributed any weight to the presumption .... ); see e.g., Hueter v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 91 U.S.P.Q. 238, 241 (N.D. Ohio 1951) (placing the
burden of establishing patent validity on the patentee); Myers v. Beall Pipe &
Tank Corp., 90 F. Supp. 265, 268 (D. Or. 1948) (same), aff'd sub nom. Fruehauf
Trailer Co. v. Myers, 181 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1950); Fischer v. Karl, 6 F.R.D.
268, 269 (E.D.N.Y. 1946) (noting that the "presumption of validity of a patent
has been greatly reduced almost to the point where the presumption is the other
way"); U.S. v. Patterson, 205 F. 292, 298 (S.D. Ohio 1913) (same); see also
Baker & Co. v. Fischer, 52 F. Supp. 910, 911 (D.N.J. 1943) (noting that,
generally, lower quality of patents issued "illustrate[d] the reason for the judicial
weakening of the presumption of invention"). Thus, a purpose of Section 282
was to settle this inconsistency and establish that patents are always presumed
valid and the burden is always on the challenger. AmHoist & Derrick Co., 725
F.2d at 1359 (observing that 35 U.S.C. § 282 was "for the benefit of those
cynical judges who [applied] the presumption [as] the other way around")
(internal quotations omitted).
142 Holder Letter, supra note 137.
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internationally." 43  Moreover, departing from the heightened
evidentiary standard could stifle innovation by reducing
investment in and incentives to obtain patents. 144
V. HOW THE BATTLE LINES WERE DRAWN
Businesses of all types and sizes, interest groups, research
organizations, and trade associations have lined up on opposing
sides of this debate and anxiously await the Court's decision.
Observers have expressed various opinions as to the defining
differences between those supporting Microsoft's position and
those backing i4i.145 Those in favor of reducing the clear and
convincing standard have been perceived as protective of
innovation, and those opposed to the change have been described
as "patent-reliant" and protective of patent rights.146  Yet, both
sides own a similar number of patents,147 suggesting that they are
equally interested in protecting patent rights.
A significant difference in past litigation experience and
perspective, as well as self-interest, exists between both sides, and
this difference in experience appears to determine which side of
the battle one supports. The differences in patent litigation
experience were discovered through a review of federal court
143 Id.; see also Brief in Opposition of Certiorari, supra note 138, at 16-18.
144 Holder Letter, supra note 137.
145 See, e.g., Companies Take Sides in Microsoft (Nasdaq: MSFT), i4i Patent
Lawsuit, EVERYTHING GOLD, http://everythinggold.blogspot.com/2010/12/
companies-takes-sides-in-microsoft.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2010); Paul F.
Morgan, Guest Post: Microsoft v. i4i-Is the Sky Really Falling?, PATENTLY-O
(Jan. 9, 2011, 10:50 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/01/microsoft-
v-i4i-is-the-sky-really-falling.html.
146 See Companies Take Sides, supra note 145; Morgan, supra note 145.
147 This observation is based on searching United States patents issued to the
companies supporting the respective sides. The searches were performed in
January 2011 using Patbase, a searchable subscription database of patents issued
in the U.S. and many other countries that contains inventor names as well as
companies that are assignees of the patents. The searches revealed no
significant difference between the two sides, on the whole, in the number of
patents held. Information about Patbase is available at
http://www.patbase.com/pboverview.pdf.
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dockets from the past decade.'48 This analysis enabled a rough
estimate of the volume of patent litigation involving each side to
be developed. This research included calculating the number of
times that members of each side appeared as a plaintiff or
defendant in patent cases. Although not a scientific sampling, the
trends were nevertheless significant.
In general, those opposed to lowering the evidentiary standard
(the "i4i supporters") were more than twice as likely to have been
plaintiffs as defendants in patent litigation.149 In a sharp and
surprising contrast, those in favor of the change (the "Microsoft
supporters") were about six times as likely to have been
defendants.' Since 2000, the i4i supporters have been plaintiffs in
approximately 70 percent of the patent cases in which they
participated.'' At the same time, the Microsoft supporters were
defendants in over 85 percent of the total number of patent cases in
which they had participated.152 Put another way, those companies
seeking to lower the standard for proving invalidity were
themselves the plaintiffs faced with defending validity of their
patents in less than 15 percent of all the patent cases in which they
were involved.'53
148 This review was conducted in January 2011 by the authors. See infra text
explaining search, chart summarizing results of case docket search, and note 149
for more information.
149 These numbers include several assumptions that make them very rough
approximations. Nevertheless, the differences between the two groups are so
drastic that it is highly unlikely that the assumptions affected the size of either
group disproportionately, or affected the numbers overall to a degree significant
enough to account for the extreme differences between the groups. The
following assumptions were made: 1) Infringement Litigation-assuming that
"patent" cases on district court dockets allege infringement; 2) Plaintiff-used
as a proxy for the party claiming infringement, understanding that the roles may
be reversed in a declaratory judgment or other similar action; and 3)
Defendant-a proxy for the party defending against infringement.
150 See infra table "Summary of Westlaw Docket Research" summarizing
results of case docket search.
151 Infra table "Summary of Westlaw Docket Research."
152 Infra table "Summary of Westlaw Docket Research."
1' Infra table "Summary of Westlaw Docket Research."
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Summary of Westlaw Docket Research for U.S. District Court Patent Litigation
Percent
times Percent Ratio:
Plaintiff times # Times
Patent in Def. in Plaintiff
Cases Group's Group's to
Group 154 Cases as Cases as Total Total # Times
(# companies) Total Plaintiff Defendant Cases Cases Defendant
Microsoft &
Amici
(23 companies) 1,866 273 1,593 14.6% 85.4% 6 to 35
Microsoft &
Amici &
Interest Grp
Assoc Amici
Members 55
(82 companies) 2,588 350 2,238 13.5% 86.5% 5 to 32
i4i + Holder
Letter Signers
(161
companies) 1,643 1,123 520 68.4% 31.6% 13 to 6
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the strength of the policy arguments on both sides of
the battle, the Supreme Court is likely to decide the i4i case on the
154 Patent cases were determined by searching for each entity in Westlaw's
database of U.S. District Court dockets, which contains docket information from
January 1, 2000 through the present and were identified by searching for the
"patent" Nature of Suit designation. There is a margin of error simply due to the
entity name used because many companies have merged, been acquired, or
changed names over the past ten years. Thus, although not scientific, the
extreme differences between the groups are so striking that it is unlikely that the
assumptions affected the results substantially.
55 Because the Holder Letter signatories included many companies who
seemed to be signing as members of associations that also signed the letter,
thereby increasing the number of supporters and diluting their numbers, this
comparison also includes members of several of the associations that submitted
amicus briefs in support of Microsoft's Petition for Certiorari: The Clearing
House Association, CTIA-The Wireless Association, and Computer &
Communications Industry Association. These groups have readily available
membership lists and a manageable number of members for inclusion in the
searches.
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basis of statutory interpretation and precedent. Simply because it
granted certiorari, it appears that the Supreme Court is ready to
lower the standard for establishing invalidity at least for those
claims involving prior art not considered by the PTO. The Court's
recent decisions in patent cases suggest that perhaps the Court is
becoming concerned that too many patents of questionable utility
and validity have been issued."' Lowering the standard required to
prove invalidity, particularly in cases where the invalidating art
was not before the PTO during prosecution, could serve as a check
on the prosecution process.
With the amount of debate on this issue, it is likely that the
Supreme Court's decision will not be the last time the standard for
proving invalidity is discussed. It is quite possible that the losing
side will seek Congressional support for amending the Patent Act
to state expressly what is required to establish invalidity.
Interestingly, the practical effect of lowering the standard is
less certain. Given jurors' perception of the significance of the
PTO's expertise in deciding to issue a patent and the weight they
afford to a patent as a result of this perception, a change in the
evidentiary standard may not impact jury outcomes in a significant
way."' Nevertheless, because of the high cost of patent litigation,
a change in this standard will likely cause some potential litigants
to reconsider whether to engage in a costly battle, particularly if
the patent at issue is of questionable validity.
1 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (reversing Federal
Circuit precedent and ruling that a patentee that succeeds on an infringement
claim is not (essentially) automatically entitled to a permanent injunction); KSR
Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), (holding that patent challenger is
not required to show that prior art shows a teaching, suggestion or motivation to
combine elements to form the invention and criticizing standards for
obviousness at the PTO and in the courts); Quanta v. LG Elec., 553 U.S. 617
(2008) (finding that method patents are subject to the doctrine of patent
exhaustion); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 177 L. Ed. 2d 792 (2010)
(Stevens J., concurring) (questioning patentability of business methods).
157 See Morgan, supra note 145 (expressing skepticism about many of the
predicted effects of eliminating the clear and convincing standard).
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In sum, the i4i case presents patent litigants with several
important lessons. First, issues that a party intends to appeal
should be preserved in pre-verdict JMOL motions. Second, with a
limited scope of review, even a substantial damages award can be
upheld if there is any evidentiary basis for it. And, third, an
invalidity defense based on prior art not before the PTO during
prosecution may no longer have to be proven through clear and
convincing evidence. Therefore, these lessons demonstrate that the
i4i case could significantly change the landscape of patent
litigation.
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